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Setting Physicians’ Prices in FFS Medicare:
 
An Economic Perspective
 
Bryan Dowd, Ph.D., Roger Feldman, Ph.D., John Nyman, Ph.D., and Bob Town, Ph.D. 
Recent policy discussions by the Medicare 
Payment Advisory Commission (MedPAC) 
regarding physician prices in the traditional 
fee-for-service (FFS) Medicare Program reflect 
movement toward a market pricing model. 
Earlier objectives such as sustainable levels 
of spending have given way to concerns over 
the relationship between fees and actual costs, 
access to care, and the importance of demand 
and supply in local markets. An important 
objective in other policy settings is economi­
cally efficient distribution of services. We 
ex­plain the meaning of economic efficiency 
for Medicare physician prices and ex­plore 
difficulties one might encounter in pursuing 
economic efficiency, as well as the cost of not 
pursuing it. 
intrODUCtiOn
Setting prices for physicians’ services in 
the traditional FFS Medicare Program is a 
topic of great importance to physicians, 
taxpayers, Medicare beneficiaries, and pol­
icymakers. Doctors are concerned about 
their practice revenue, taxpayers about 
taxes, beneficiaries about the cost of care 
and access to physician services, and poli­
cymakers about the cost and performance 
of the Medicare Program. 
Despite the importance of setting FFS 
Medicare prices, the objectives of the price-
setting process have not always been clear 
(Pauly, 1991). In this article, we review 
recent discussions of Medicare payment 
The authors are with the University of Minnesota. The
statements expressed in this article are those of the authors
and do not necessarily reflect the views or policies of the Uni­
versity of Minnesota or the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid 
Services (CMS). 
policy that have appeared in MedPAC 
reports. MedPAC was established by the 
1997 Balanced Budget Act to advise Con­
gress on the Medicare Program and is the 
successor to both the Physician Payment 
Review Commission (PPRC) and the Pros­
pective Payment Assessment Commission. 
MedPAC’s reports not only present exten­
sive analyses of policy issues, but also carry 
substantial political influence, and thus
provide a reasonable focus for this analysis. 
Reviewing MedPAC’s Reports to Con­
gress (2000-2005), we find a gradual move­
ment toward the goal of setting efficient 
prices in the Medicare Program. We dis­
cuss how economic efficiency might be 
interpreted for Medicare physician prices 
and some of the difficulties one might 
encounter in pursuing it, as well as the cost 
of not pursuing it. 
We assume that Medicare will continue 
to pay physicians on the basis of a fee sched­
ule, but otherwise our analysis is general. 
We do not assume that the types of services 
covered by Medicare will remain the same, 
or even that FFS Medicare will be adminis­
tered by the government. The government 
might contract administration of FFS Medi­
care to private organizations, which already 
process claims and conduct quality assur­
ance activities.1 Although we couch the dis­
cussion in terms of physician fees, much of 
the analysis could apply to setting prices for 
other types of services, including hospital 
services and prescription drugs. 
1 Some of the issues discussed in this analysis would be obviated 
if local private organizations had the authority to set fees. 
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Medicare’s Physician Pricing 
Objectives 
Two primary features of any FFS pay­
ment system are the ways in which the 
quantity of services is defined and unit 
prices are set. Different Medicare policy 
initiatives have focused on each feature. In 
the 1980s, resource-based relative value 
units (RBRVUs) represented a new way to 
define the quantity of physician services 
(Hsiao et al., 1988). Equally important, 
however, is the unit price of services, or the 
multiplier that converts RBRVUs into pay­
ment amounts, because it influences the 
supply of services by physicians. This anal­
ysis focuses on the objectives that Medi­
care might pursue when it sets the multiplier 
to determine unit prices. 
One of the earliest objectives of setting 
FFS Medicare prices was controlling total 
expenditures. Concern over total spending 
began shortly after the program was estab­
lished in 1965 (Dowd, Feldman, and 
Christianson, 1996). Physician pricing pro­
visions in the 1989 Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation Act (OBRA) were a response 
to the widely held perception that the usual, 
customary, and reasonable method of pay­
ing physicians was inherently inflationary. 
In addition to establishing the RBRVU fee 
schedule, OBRA established volume per­
formance standards, designed to control 
expenditures on physician services. These 
standards linked the growth in physician 
fees to growth in the volume of services 
provided by all physicians. This method of 
regulating fees also proved to be inherently 
inflationary. In response, Congress estab­
lished a sustainable growth rate as part of 
the 1997 Balanced Budget Act. This linked 
growth in physician fees to growth in the 
gross domestic product, adjusted for physi­
cian practice cost inflation, changes in FFS 
Medicare enrollment, and the effects of 
laws and regulations (Hackbarth, 2005). 
MedPAC (2001) modified the goal of FFS 
pricing to be maintenance of sustainable 
expenditure growth while “…accounting 
for factors that affect the cost of providing 
care.” In their report they suggested that 
Congress consider a new approach to 
updating the FFS Medicare fee schedule 
that would reflect more accurately changes 
in the unit costs of providing physician ser­
vices. This interest in providers’ costs could 
be interpreted as greater emphasis on
supply, as opposed to consumer demand. 
The objective of payment adequacy was 
introduced by Med PAC (2002) and defined 
operationally as access to physician ser­
vices. The emphasis on payment adequacy 
could be interpreted as recognition that 
both supply and demand determine the 
quantity of Medicare services supplied by 
physicians. However, there was no discus­
sion of possible disparities between supply 
and demand or of the notion that Medicare 
might wish to adjust prices on the basis of 
such disparities. 
The emphasis on access intensified after 
2002. Anecdotal reports of access problems 
were beginning to surface in selected mar­
kets (e.g., Seattle, Denver, and Austin). 
However, it was not clear that these prob­
lems were specific to Medicare, if they 
existed at all. Data from the 2000-2003 
Consumer Assessment of Health Plans 
Surveys showed that about 90 percent of 
beneficiaries seeking a new physician 
reported minor or no problems doing so, 
while special Targeted Beneficiary Surveys 
commissioned by CMS found that physi­
cian access generally was better for Medi­
care beneficiaries than for the privately 
insured population. MedPAC (2004) also 
began reporting comparisons of Medicare 
physician fees to those of private insurers. 
Although Medicare’s prices were 66 percent 
of private fees in 1994, they were 83 percent 
of private fees in 2001, primarily due to a 
decline in private fees. 
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MedPAC’s reports reflect a gradual, but 
important, trend in their thinking about 
setting FFS Medicare prices. In one sense, 
their objectives have evolved from global 
objectives (sustainable growth in total pro­
gram expenditures) toward recognition of 
the importance of local variations in supply 
and demand. Nonetheless, MedPAC con­
tinues to recommend basing physician 
price increases on nationwide estimates of 
inflation in the prices of inputs to physician 
services and increased productivity. 
The evolution of MedPAC’s thinking also 
can be viewed as a process of refinement— 
from the early focus on total expenditures 
(sustainable growth), to interest in supply 
curves (accurate accounting for cost fac­
tors and providers’ willingness to see 
patients), and most recently, a combination 
of supply and demand factors (access to 
care). Finally, MedPAC’s comparisons of 
Medicare fees to those of private insurers 
reflect the recognition that FFS Medicare 
is not the only payer in the market. 
MedPAC’s growing concern over the 
supply and demand for physicians’ services 
in the Medicare Program suggests move­
ment toward a market model of pricing.
But what would a market pricing model for 
physician services look like? 
A perfectly competitive market produces 
a competitive equilibrium in which supply 
and demand are equal. There is no unsatis­
fied demand for services, given beneficia­
ries’ income and preferences, and no 
unsatisfied supply of services, given physi­
cians’ cost functions. The competitive equi­
librium is ideal in the narrow, but important 
sense of economic efficiency. Efficiency 
means that no provider or consumer can be 
made better off without making another 
provider or consumer worse off. An effi­
cient distribution of resources is termed 
“Pareto optimal.” There are many Pareto 
optimal distributions of resources. Society 
must choose among them using some type 
of decision rule. However, any efficient dis­
tribution of resources can be achieved by 
adjusting the initial distribution of income, 
either through cash or in-kind transfers, 
and then allowing a competitive market to 
reach equilibrium. This is the second fun­
damental theorem of welfare economics 
(Rosen, 2002; Varian, 1992). 
Income could be redistributed to the 
poor and disabled elderly through Social 
Security, leaving Medicare free to pursue 
efficient prices. Our discussion of Medicare 
pricing focuses primarily on economic
efficiency, but we point out that Medicare 
fees could have an important impact on 
fairness of access to services by privately 
insured consumers. 
DiagraMMatiC eXPOSitiOn OF 
MeDiCare PriCing OBJeCtiveS 
Competitive Market for Physicians’ 
Services 
Figure 1 shows the simplest competitive 
market for physician services. In this sim­
plest model, there is no insurance so con­
sumers pay out-of-pocket expenses for 
physician services. At the competitive equi­
librium price (PC) the amount of services 
demanded by consumers equals the amount 
of services that providers are willing to sup­
ply (QE). Total expenditures for services 
are the product of PC times QE. 
In Figure 1, any price other than PC is 
inefficient. At PH, for example, providers 
would be willing to supply QHS services, 
but beneficiaries would demand only QHD. 
Similarly, at PL, beneficiaries would demand 
QLD services, but providers would supply 
only QLS. Once price departs from PC, the 
quantity of services observed in the mar­
ket is determined by the lesser of demand 
or supply, and there will be either excess 
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Figure 1
 
Model of the Market for Physicians’ Services Without Insurance
 
Supply 
PH 
PC 
PL 
Demand 
0 
Quantity of Services 
NOTES: PC is the competitive equilibrium price. PH is a price higher than the competitive 
equilibrium price. PL is a price lower than the competitive equilibrium price. QE is the 
quantity of services demanded and supplied at price PC. QLS is the quantity of services 
supplied at price PL. QLD is the quantity of services supplied at price PL. QHS is the quantity 
of services supplied at price PH. QHD is the quantity of services demanded at price PH. 0 is 
the number zero. The competitive equilibrium price (PC) and quantity (QE) correspond to the 
intersection of the market demand and supply curves (QE). 
SOURCE: Dowd, B., Feldman, R., Nyman, J., and Town, B., University of Minnesota, 2006. 
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supply (beyond the quantity demanded by 
consumers) or excess demand (beyond the 
quantity supplied by providers). 
advantages and Disadvantages of 
insurance Coverage 
The perfectly competitive market with­
out insurance ignores an important prob­
lem: demand for health care is uncertain 
and treatments for many illnesses are 
extremely expensive. Risk-averse consum­
ers seek financial protection from these 
events by purchasing health insurance. 
The primary advantage of health insur­
ance is that it protects consumers from
the costs associated with adverse health
events by spreading the risk over a pool of
individuals. However, in its most common 
form, health insurance pays off in the event 
of illness by reducing the consumer’s out-
of-pocket price of services. For example, 
insurance might cover 80 percent of
medical expenditures, while the consumer 
pays the remaining 20 percent. This type
of price-reduction insurance distorts the
consumer’s price of health care services, 
resulting in increased consumer demand 
for services. Economists refer to the
extra consumption induced by insurance as
moral hazard. 
Figure 2 illustrates the effect of insurance 
on the demand for medical care. There
are two demand curves: one represent­
ing demand with insurance, (DI), and one
representing demand without insurance 
(DNI). DI is the demand curve seen by the 
providers of services to insured consumers. 
HealtH Care FinanCing review/winter 2006-2007/Volume 28, Number 2 100
  
     
      
Figure 2
 
Competitive Market for Medical Care with Insurance
 
DI 
Supply 
 
DNI 
QNI QI 
Quantity of Services 
PI 
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NOTES: PI is the consumer’s out-of-pocket price of services with insurance. PNI is the 
consumer’s out-of-pocket price of services without insurance. QI is the quantity of  
services demanded by the consumer at PI. QNI is the quantity of services demanded by the 
consumer at PNI. DI is demand with insurance. DNI is demand without insurance. 
SOURCE: Dowd, B., Feldman, R., Nyman, J., and Town, B., University of Minnesota, 2006. 
The DI is nearly vertical reflecting our 
assumption that most Medicare beneficia­
ries in FFS Medicare have supplementary 
Medigap insurance that substantially re­
duces the consumer’s out-of-pocket price so 
that changing the supply price of services 
has little effect on demand. 
The conventional view of moral hazard is 
that although consumers derive some ben­
efit from the additional services triggered 
by price-reduction insurance, the additional 
services are valued by consumers at less 
than their cost. (If the services were valued 
at least as much as their cost, consumers 
would have purchased them in the absence 
of insurance.) The distortion of prices 
induced by price-reduction insurance thus 
is a form of market failure, resulting in an 
inefficient distribution of health care ser­
vices relative to other goods and services 
in the market. 
However, Nyman (2003) has suggested 
that moral hazard has both an efficient and 
an inefficient component. He uses the fol­
lowing thought experiment to distinguish 
between efficient and inefficient moral haz­
ard. Conventional health insurance pays off 
by reducing the price of health care ser­
vices. Suppose, however, that health insur­
ance paid off by giving policyholders a cash 
payment equal to the amount that insured 
consumers spend under the traditional 
price-reduction form of insurance. Con­
sumers would be free to spend the cash 
payment on health care or anything else. 
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Figure 3
 
Efficient and Inefficient Moral Hazard
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NOTES: The three bars represent the level of spending by the same individual if the individual (1) was uninsured, (2) had insurance 
that provide a cash payment if the individual had a particular medical condition, or (3) had traditional health insurance that reduces the 
consumer’s out-of-pocket price of services. 
SOURCE: Dowd, B., Feldman, R., Nyman, J., and Town, B., University of Minnesota, 2006. 
Now suppose that individuals were 
assigned randomly to (1) no insurance, (2) 
cash payoff policies, or (3) traditional
price-reduction insurance. Comparing the
expenditure on health care by uninsured 
individuals and individuals with traditional 
price-reduction insurance would yield an 
estimate of total moral hazard. Comparing 
the expenditure on health care by individu­
als with traditional insurance versus
cash payoff policies would estimate the 
amount of inefficient moral hazard. The 
comparison is illustrated in Figure 3. In this
example, expenditures in response to a 
particular illness by uninsured consumers 
are $20,000, while individuals with tradi­
tional price reducing insurance spend 
$100,000, so total moral hazard is $80,000 
($100,000 - $20,000). Individuals with cash 
payoff policies spend $80,000 on health care, 
and thus the amount of inefficient moral 
hazard is $20,000 ($100,000 - $80,000). By 
subtraction, the remaining moral hazard of 
$60,000 is efficient ($80,000 - $20,000). Thus, 
the inefficient portion of moral hazard is
the additional health care demand attribut­
able to the use of price-reduction insurance
versus cash payoff insurance. 
If Medicare beneficiaries paid their entire 
health insurance premiums out-of-pocket, 
then we might assume that the policies 
they demanded reflected the best balance 
of moral hazard and protection against
risk. However, Medicare premiums are 
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heavily subsidized by the government, 
even when prepayment of premiums during 
the beneficiary’s income-earning years is
considered.2 Medicare beneficiaries retiring 
in 1994 received, on average, $5.19 in Part 
A benefits for every dollar they paid into the 
system (King, 1994). Part B premiums are 
designed to cover only 25 percent of costs. 
Thus, beneficiaries lobby the government 
for more Medicare coverage, with greater 
levels of moral hazard, than one would 
observe in the absence of those subsidies. 
The subsidy of Medicare premiums obli­
gates Medicare to distinguish between
efficient and inefficient moral hazard. 
Furthermore, because Medicare pays for 
health services with taxes (primarily in­
come and wage taxes), the calculation of 
efficient moral hazard should include a 
comparison of the benefits associated with 
another dollar of Medicare spending to the 
administrative cost of collecting the addi­
tional dollar of tax revenue and the effect of 
those taxes on productivity (known as the 
deadweight loss of tax revenue). 
In theory, Medicare could reduce 
demand by increasing beneficiaries’ coin­
surance and deductibles. However, most 
FFS Medicare beneficiaries purchase sup­
plementary insurance that covers much of 
their point-of-purchase cost sharing, and 
the government subsidizes the purchase of 
that supplementary coverage.3 We assume 
that such supplementary coverage will 
remain legal, unrestricted, and subsidized, 
so most beneficiaries will continue to
purchase it. Thus, manipulating point-
of-purchase cost sharing (i.e., coinsurance 
and deductible) is likely to be a way to
regulate consumption. 
2 Employment-based health insurance premiums and out-of­
pocket spending on health care services also receive implicit 
subsidy through exemption from State and Federal personal
income and FICA taxes. 
3 Medigap premiums are subsidized because Medicare pays 
approximately 80 percent of the cost of additional utiliza­
tion induced by filling the gaps in the entitlement coverage
(Christensen, 1987). 
Alternatively, Medicare could reduce 
consumption by reducing the supply price 
of services—for example, to PL in Figure 
1. For the remainder of the analysis, we 
assume that Medicare influences consump­
tion primarily by setting the supply price of 
services, rather than the demand price faced 
by beneficiaries. Thus, when we refer to the 
price of physician services we are referring 
to the price paid to providers, rather than 
the price faced by beneficiaries. 
Wedenotethequantityofservicesdeemed 
efficient by Medicare as QM and we assume 
that the government’s objective is to pur­
chase QM for FFS Medicare beneficiaries. 
QM is not necessarily equal to QNI (or to QI), 
but may reflect efficient moral hazard and 
other considerations as described in the 
remainder of the article. 
Multiple Payers 
Despite MedPAC’s recent comparison of 
Medicare physician fees to those of private 
insurers, Medicare’s current price-setting 
policy does not recognize explicitly any 
interaction of its prices with activity in the 
private health insurance market. But the 
FFS Medicare Program does not exist in 
isolation from private health insurance. 
Virtually all types of medical care (with the 
possible exception of treatment for end 
stage renal disease) consumed by Medicare 
beneficiaries also are consumed by individ­
uals with private insurance. 
Figure 4 shows the private demand and 
adjusted total demand curves for physician 
services, along with the market supply 
curve. Total demand is the sum of private 
demand and QM. The efficient total quan­
tity of services is found where total demand 
is equal to supply. 
Figure 4 also illustrates an important 
fact about the Medicare Program: because 
Medicare is a large health plan and com­
petes with private insurers for the services 
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Figure 4
 
Efficient Medicare Price in a Competitive Market with Multiple Payers
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Demand 
P Medicare Fee Level 
QM 
0 QP Private Quantity + QM 
Quantity 
        NOTES: QM is the quantity of services deemed efficient by Medicare. QP is the level of services demanded by 
privately insured consumers at price P. P is the price of services that equalizes total demand and supply. 
SOURCE: Dowd, B., Feldman, R., Nyman, J., and Town, B., University of Minnesota, 2006. 
of the same set of physicians, the prices
that Medicare pays for services influ­
ence the level of consumption by privately 
insured consumers. If the Medicare price 
is higher than P, then consumption by Medi­
care beneficiaries will increase (assuming 
QM is less than the amount of services 
that beneficiaries would demand at zero 
out-of-pocket price) and consumption by 
privately insured consumers will decrease. 
The opposite outcome will happen if the 
Medicare price is lower than P. 
Price P is economically efficient, given an 
initial distribution of resources and deter­
mination of QM. However, two problems 
could arise. First, the resulting level of pri­
vate consumption (QP) could be considered 
unfair if the initial distribution of resources 
was unfair. With over 40 million uninsured 
Americans under age 65, the government 
needs to consider carefully its policies 
regarding unmet demand by Medicare 
beneficiaries. Should the government set 
Medicare fees high enough to eliminate all 
excess demand by Medicare beneficiaries? 
Recall that many FFS Medicare beneficia­
ries face out-of-pocket prices that are close 
to zero. 
Second, the efficiency of price P could be 
threatened by the way in which physicians 
respond to a reduction in the Medicare 
price. Individual physicians could respond 
to Medicare fee changes by altering either 
the quantity or quality of services provided 
to Medicare beneficiaries. If physicians 
responded to a price decrease by rationing 
medical care according to any method 
other than willingness to pay, the resulting 
distribution of Medicare services would be 
inefficient (in the absence of other sources 
of market failure), even though the total 
quantity of services consumed by Medicare 
beneficiaries remained at QM. For example, 
rationing on the basis of the beneficiary’s 
willingness to wait in the office would
be inefficient. 
HealtH Care FinanCing review/winter 2006-2007/Volume 28, Number 2 104
     
      
     
      
      
     
       
    
      
       
     
     
     
       
     
     
      
     
     
     
      
     
  
 
Allowing physicians to charge some 
Medicare beneficiaries a fee in addition to 
the government payment rate would allevi­
ate that inefficiency. This practice is known 
as balance billing. Physicians have a limited 
ability to balance bill Medicare patients, 
but only if they do not accept assignment. 
Accepting assignment means that physi­
cians agree to accept Medicare’s price as 
payment in full. In return, the physician can 
bill Medicare directly, collecting only the 
coinsurance and deductible from the patient. 
Physicians who agree to accept assign­
ment on all allowed claims are referred to 
as participating physicians and receive a 
5-percent increase in fees. However, par­
ticipation does not carry an obligation to 
see Medicare patients. Limits on balance 
billing effectively limit the physician’s addi­
tional revenue to 9.25 percent (MedPAC, 
2004) and some States have passed legisla­
tion prohibiting balance billing of Medicare 
patients (McKnight, 2004). 
It appears doubtful that balance billing is 
needed on a large scale. Ninety-nine per­
cent of allowed Medicare charges were 
assigned in 2003. Moreover, physician par­
ticipation and assignment rates in Medicare 
have been rising in recent years (MedPAC, 
2004). These data, taken in conjunction 
with the rising rate at which physicians are 
accepting new Medicare patients and 
MedPAC’s surveys that show a narrowing 
gap between Medicare and private physi­
cian prices, suggest that the marginal net 
revenue of Medicare versus privately-
insured patients is not substantially differ­
ent. McKnight (2004) finds little effect of 
balance billing on the quality or quantity of 
Medicare physician services. 
In response to an early draft of this arti­
cle, MedPAC staff expressed concern that 
if payments were not adjusted adequately 
for differences in patient costs, then low­
ering Medicare fees might result in physi­
cians dropping higher-cost patients. The 
presumption was that these patients likely 
would be Medicare beneficiaries. MedPAC’s 
concern implies that Medicare has not 
adjusted physician prices adequately for 
the extra complexity of Medicare patients. 
If that is the case, then patients with uncom­
pensated levels of complexity will be dis­
criminated against in the current payment 
system. The preferred solution would be to 
correct the relative fees and then pursue 
efficient pricing. 
Manipulating the general supply price of 
physician services would not address other 
important problems. Analyses by Baicker 
et al. (2004), Fisher et al. (2004; 2003a,b), 
and Wennberg, Fisher, and Skinner (2002), 
suggest that a significant percentage of 
medical spending may not be associated 
with improvements in patient health. 
Addressing that issue could require adjust­
ments in the prices of specific services to 
specific patients, rather than overall adjust­
ment to the fee schedule. Another approach 
might be better consumer information. 
Primary care physicians and their patients 
will respond to improved information on 
the risks and benefits of some surgical 
interventions (Kolata, 2006). 
imperfect Competition among Health 
Care Providers 
In addition to insurance itself, price dis­
tortions can arise if providers have market 
power. Market power can result from natu­
ral monopoly (decreasing marginal cost) 
or restricted entry that keeps new compe­
titors out of the market when profits exceed 
the competitive rate of return. When a
single provider controls the entire supply 
of a service, the provider’s marginal cost 
curve is the same as the market supply 
curve. A monopolistic provider sets price at 
the intersection of marginal revenue and 
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Figure 5
 
Monopolistic Local Market for Health Care Services with Government-Set Prices
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NOTES: D is Demand. PE is the competitive equilibrium price. QE is the competitive 
equilibrium quantity. P is the monopolist’s price. Q is the monopolist’s quantity. 
SOURCE: Dowd, B., Feldman, R., Nyman, J., and Town, B., University of Minnesota, 2006. 
marginal cost, resulting in restricted output 
and a higher price of services compared 
with the competitive equilibrium. 
Figure 5 shows a monopolistic market 
where demand and marginal revenue are D 
and MR, respectively. The efficient price is 
PE with demand QE. However, the profit-
maximizing price for the monopolist is P 
with demand Q. 
How should the government respond to 
this situation? In a market with only one 
type of consumer (e.g., Medicare beneficia­
ries), a public utility response would give 
the government the power to set prices. 
The perfectly informed regulator would set 
price at PE. The monopolist would respond 
by supplying quantity QE, which corre­
sponds to consumer demand at PE, thus 
achieving the same result as the competi­
tive market. But the real world is more com­
plicated because there are multiple payers. 
Combination of Multiple Payers
and a Monopolistic Provider 
Figure 6 shows the combination of multi­
ple payers and a monopolistic provider. 
Because health care services cannot be 
resold, a monopolistic provider can price 
discriminate between privately insured 
consumers and FFS Medicare beneficia­
ries. The monopolist will supply services to 
each payer so that the marginal revenue 
from privately insured consumers equals 
the government price and the marginal 
cost of services (assuming that costs are 
the same in the two markets). 
The monopolistic provider’s profit is: π = 
RP (QP) + (PG × QM) – C(QP + QM) where π 
= profit; RP = revenue from privately-insured 
patients; QP and QM are quantities of ser­
vices supplied to privately-insured and FFS 
Medicare patients, respectively; PG = the 
FFS Medicare fee; and C = cost. Profit max­
imization with respect to QP and QM yields 
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Figure 6
 
Market with Multiple Payers, Government Prices, and a Monopolistic Provider
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NOTES: PG is the initial price of Medicare services set by the government. PP is the 
monopolist’s price when then government’s price is PG. PG/ is the new, lower price 
of Medicare services set by the government. PP/ is the monopolist’s price when then 
government’s price is PG/. QP is the quantity of services demanded by privately insured 
consumers at price PP QP.
 / is the quantity of services demanded by privately insured 
consumers at price PP/. QT is the total quantity of services demanded by all consumers 

when the government’s price is PG/. 0 is the number zero.
 
SOURCE: Dowd, B., Feldman, R., Nyman, J., and Town, B., University of Minnesota, 2006. 
∂RP/∂QP = PG = ∂C/∂(QP + QM), which 
means the marginal revenue from private 
patients must equal the government fee 
and the marginal cost of services in both 
markets combined. We assume that ∂C/∂QP 
= ∂C/∂QM and that the potential number of 
Medicare patients is unlimited. 
If FFS Medicare did not set prices and 
FFS Medicare beneficiaries were less price-
sensitive than privately insured consumers, 
then beneficiaries would pay higher prices, 
and vice versa. However, FFS Medicare can 
set prices for its own beneficiaries. In that 
case, the monopolistic provider maximizes 
profit by supplying services to privately 
insured consumers up to the point (QP) 
where marginal revenue in the private mar­
ket equals the government-determined 
price for FFS Medicare services. The 
amount of services supplied to FFS 
Medicare beneficiaries is determined by 
the intersection of the government price 
with overall marginal cost. 
Suppose the government wanted to pur­
chase QG physicians’ services for Medicare 
beneficiaries based on supply and demand 
for Medicare services in a single market, 
adjusted for inefficient moral hazard. By 
setting price at PG, the government could 
get providers to supply QG. But would that 
quantity of services be the efficient quan­
tity that we refer to as QM? The outcome 
shown in Figure 6 is inefficient due to the 
presence of monopoly power in the private 
insurance market. Privately insured con­
sumers value an additional unit of service 
at PP dollars, but Medicare values the same 
marginal service at only PG dollars. Thus, 
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privately insured consumers would be will­
ing to pay the government to reduce PG to 
something like PG/. 
The government could increase effi­
ciency by reducing its price below PG, to 
the point that access problems start to 
appear in FFS Medicare. This would induce 
providers to reduce the private price to PP/ 
and increase the quantity of services sup­
plied to privately insured consumers to 
QP/. Medicare beneficiaries then would be 
supplied only QG/ services. The govern­
ment must determine whether the target 
level of consumption for Medicare benefi­
ciaries (QM) is QG, QG/, or some other level 
of consumption. The fairness of this
outcome depends on the fairness of the 
processes that determine private demand 
and QM, including the initial distribution
of income. 
If private demand became less elastic 
(for example, because the prevalence of ill­
ness increased), the monopolist would 
raise its price to private consumers. If FFS 
Medicare chose to offset this effect, it 
would do so by lowering its price. The same 
approach would apply to a market in which 
providers had greater monopoly power— 
FFS Medicare should pay less in that mar­
ket to induce the monopolist to reduce its 
price (and increase the supply) of services 
to privately insured consumers. 
local Market variation in Demand 
and Supply 
Each topic discussed thus far could apply 
either to FFS Medicare as a whole or to 
individual local markets. If there are signifi­
cant variations in demand and supply in 
local markets, then efficient pricing 
requires that Medicare recognize those dif­
ferences. Cutler and Sheiner (1999) found 
that illness variables explained 66 percent 
of the variance in adjusted Medicare spend­
ing among hospital referral regions. Adding 
demographic factors (e.g., Hispanic ethnic­
ity and sex) explained 70 percent of the 
variance; and health maintenance organiza­
tion and medical supply variables, includ­
ing the percent of doctors who are specialists 
and the supply of hospital beds, added 10 
percent to explained variance. In an earlier 
study with a different specification, Rizzo 
(1992) found that per capita income was 
negatively related to the probability of uti­
lizing some Part A services, but positively 
related to the probability of utilizing some 
Part B services. These studies show that 
there is substantial variation in Medicare 
spending across markets due to variation 
in demand and supply factors. 
Adjusting prices for demand-shift vari­
ables requires careful thought in efficient 
pricing systems. In a competitive market, 
changes in demand alter the efficient price 
only if the long-run supply curve is upward-
sloping (Figure 1).4 The supply curve 
slopes upward if the prices of inputs rise 
with the quantity of output. Thus, in com­
petitive markets, Medicare could incorpo­
rate the effect of demand-shift variables 
into its price-setting decisions by adjusting 
the supply price of services for input prices. 
That is the purpose of the geographic prac­
tice cost index (GPCI), as explained by 
Zuckerman and Maxwell (2004) which 
adjusts prices for local variation in physi­
cian work, practice expense, and profes­
sional liability insurance (MedPAC, 2003). 
In its current form, however, the local mar­
kets that the GPCI uses to adjust prices are 
quite large. There are only 89 GPCI market 
areas for the entire U.S. If FFS Medicare 
adopted an efficient pricing model, it would 
be necessary to explore new market defini­
tions that correspond more closely to geo­
graphic markets for physician services.
4 The profit-maximizing monopoly price depends on the slope 
of the demand (and thus the marginal revenue) curve, but the 
efficient price always corresponds to the intersection of market 
supply and demand. 
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Factors related to the supply of services, 
including institutional differences in health 
care organizations, also can shift the local 
market supply curve. Currently, Medicare 
does not adjust prices for supply-shift
variables other than input prices. For 
example, suppose that a State prohibits
for-profit hospitals, which are more (or 
less) efficient than not-for-profit hospitals. 
Should Medicare raise (or lower) its fees 
in that State? 
Policy implications 
To implement efficient pricing, Medicare 
would need to determine the desired level 
of physician services for beneficiaries to 
consume (QM) in each market area, and 
then set prices to achieve that level of sup­
ply. The first step would be to identify the 
level of consumption that would be observed 
in a competitive market with a single insurer 
and current insurance coverage. The level 
of competition varies among markets, but a 
regression model could be estimated that 
accounted for competition, as well as other 
factors. The estimated equation could be 
used to predict QM in each market with 
high levels of competition. Medicare also 
could identify markets that scored well on 
measures of health outcomes and con­
sumer satisfaction with access to and qual­
ity of physician services. 
Second, Medicare would need to adjust 
the desired level of utilization for inefficient 
moral hazard. The way to determine the 
amount of inefficient moral hazard is to 
turn Nyman’s thought experiment into a 
real experiment. During the 1970s, the 
Federal Government spent 136 million 
(1984) dollars to determine the effect of 
coinsurance and deductibles on health care 
spending (Manning et al., 1987). To deter­
mine the amount of inefficient moral
hazard, the government could conduct 
another experiment, randomizing subjects 
to cash payoff policies and traditional price-
reduction insurance. The difference in 
health care utilization between these two 
groups would be a measure of inefficient 
moral hazard. 
Third, Medicare would need to decide if 
its prices should be adjusted to recognize 
the effect of Medicare prices on consump­
tion by privately insured consumers. This 
approachwouldrequiremonitoringofexcess 
(i.e., unmet) demand in different markets. 
Such monitoring activity should take place
regardless of Medicare’s pricing approach. 
Additional research would be needed on 
the extent to which the GPCI could be used 
to achieve efficient pricing in local mar­
kets. The current 89 GPCI regions might 
be too large to make effective adjustments 
for local variation in supply conditions. 
The data required to set Medicare prices 
that are both efficient and fair are signifi­
cant, but by no means prohibitive. Many of 
the variables currently are collected in an 
uncoordinated way, and others such as 
provider concentration should be collected 
whether or not FFS Medicare changes
its pricing approach. Any data source used 
to adjust local prices would have to be 
transparent and probably publicly avail­
able, as would the methodology used to 
adjust prices. 
It is important to understand that 
Medicare already makes implicit policy 
decisions regarding all the issues raised 
in this analysis. Medicare provides sub­
stantial subsidies for basic benefits and pri­
vate supplementary insurance, regardless 
of the beneficiary’s income, suggesting 
that moral hazard is not thought to be an 
important problem, or that all moral hazard 
is thought to be efficient. Medicare cur­
rently sets physician fees without regard to
the effect on the quantity of services 
supplied to privately insured consum­
ers. From an operational viewpoint, local 
variations in supply conditions other than 
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input prices have been deemed irrelevant,
as well. 
Clarifying the efficiency and fairness 
goals of setting FFS Medicare fees would 
bring many important topics into the
open for careful analysis and debate,
including local monopoly power, the
role of supplementary coverage, the
effect of Medicare prices on privately-
insured consumers, and the efficiency of 
moral hazard. 
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